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INTRODUCTION 
Much of the work on the groups we usually call “mediating” 
associations, including the subset we call “voluntary” associations, 
proceeds from a flawed premise.  That premise is that voluntary 
associations—private groups that are neither State, nor family, nor 
economic enterprise—are different in some fundamental way from those 
other categories, particularly from the State and the business enterprise.  
The usual model postulates a bipolar world with the State at one end of the 
axis and the Individual at the other, with all the other associations in 
society distributed between them.  This gives rise to the idea of 
“mediating” institutions, because in this model these associations “occup[y] 
a middle position” and are “interposed between the extremes;” they 
“interpose between parties in order to reconcile them or to interpret them to 
each other;” they “negotiate a compromise of hostile or incompatible 
viewpoints, demands, or attitudes;” and they “act as an intermediary agent 
in bringing, effecting, or communicating” the influences of the State and 
the Individual.1 
Under this view, analysis of such organizations is essentially 
instrumental and asks what beneficial ends mediating institutions serve in 
their interactions with the State and the Individual.  For example, Robert 
Vischer emphasizes how voluntary associations are “valuable to modern 
American society” because they allow society to “chart a middle path 
between the alienating extremes of excessive individualism and 
collectivism,” both of which are undesirable.2  In contrast, Richard Garnett 
focuses less on the middle ground and more on the important role of non-
State associations in providing competition to the State in education and the 
formation of meaning,3 and acting as a counterweight—his vivid phrase is 
“a wrench in the works”4—to the State’s impulse to hegemony.  Jason 
Mazzone’s taxonomy of voluntary associations explicitly values non-State 
associations to the degree that they foster participatory democracy in the 
State.5  The United States Supreme Court also emphasized the utility of 
                                                          
 1. 2 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1402 (1981). 
 2. See Robert K. Vischer, The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly:  Rethinking the Value of 
Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 1019 (2004) (noting that the path between 
individualism and collectivism generates conflict between associations, the Individual, and 
the State). 
 3. See Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith?  Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of 
Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 783 (2001) [hereinafter Quiet Faith] (questioning whether it 
is possible for religion to be completely removed from the interests of the State); Richard 
W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams’s Soul:  Education and the Expression of 
Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1849-50 (2001) [hereinafter Henry Adams’s Soul] 
(focusing on whether the government’s regulation of non-state associations’ role in 
education is overly burdensome). 
 4. Henry Adams’s Soul, supra note 3, at 1853-54. 
 5. See Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 748-58 (2002) 
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such groups by stating that “the constitutional shelter afforded such 
relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their 
emotional enrichment from close ties with others.  Protecting these 
relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the 
ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept 
of liberty.”6  All of these writers share the idea that for purposes of civil 
society these voluntary associations are, in Vischer’s words, “important 
relationally.”7 
This instrumental approach leads to two practical difficulties.  First, the 
effort to foster the social goods that non-State associations create by 
justifying them as valuable instrumentally—by focusing on their effects on 
the State and Individuals—is unlikely to be successful.  Vibrant 
organizations capable of resisting the State and forging alternative 
meanings that can compete with those officially sanctioned by the State 
cannot be kept as plants in a carefully tended garden, fertilized and pruned 
as the gardener sees fit.  The State—even an inclusive, democratic one—is 
not, perhaps, the group best situated to decide which organizations are or 
are not socially useful. 
The second practical difficulty with these theories is that an artificial 
distinction between different types of groups puts undue emphasis on some 
kinds of organizations and ignores others.  The family, the State, the 
church, and the business enterprise have historically been the primary 
forces creating individual identity and our general culture.  All other 
associations in society, while certainly important, pale next to these.  It is 
not a coincidence that much of the legal history of the twentieth century has 
been the story of the State’s campaigns to bring the family and the business 
enterprise more firmly under its control8 and to marginalize and trivialize 
religious associations.9  Yet business enterprises are regularly excluded 
                                                          
(arguing that the Constitution safeguards and facilitates the ability of non-State associations 
to work together). 
 6. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). 
 7. See Vischer, supra note 2, at 952 (stating that the import of the relationship between 
associations, the Individual, and the State provides associations the power to serve 
mediating roles). 
 8. Mary Anne Glendon has pointed out the interesting parallel developments of family 
law and employment law during the 1970s, in which the State began enacting no-fault 
divorce laws at the same time it began replacing the old employment-at-will doctrine with 
the modern concept of unjust dismissal.  See MARY ANNE GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND 
THE NEW PROPERTY 3-7 (1981).  On the surface this is paradoxical—the State is making it 
easier for any dissatisfied party to terminate a family relationship but harder for a 
dissatisfied party to terminate an employment relationship.  But both developments resulted 
in strengthening the State at the expense of each institution.  By permitting no-fault divorce, 
the traditional family unit was weakened, and the power of the State over family members 
(including child custody and disposition of family assets) greatly increased.  By restricting 
employment at will, the State increased its power over businesses by subjecting more of 
their internal operations to State control. 
 9. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (Anchor Books 
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from discussions of mediating institutions,10 even though they have 
enormous impacts in shaping our culture, our political landscape, and even 
the personal identities of Individuals.  To the extent we seek entities that 
can develop meanings that can conflict and compete with those of the State, 
or act as a “wrench in the works” of the State’s drive for hegemony, or 
even act as an intermediary that helps the Individual deal with the faceless 
world, business enterprises fit the bill even better than most voluntary 
associations.  
The observation that all human organizations are important because of 
their relations with other organizations has some truth to it, but as a 
building block for a theory of non-State associations the observation is 
unsound.  As a theoretical matter, it draws distinctions between entities that 
are unwarranted, according a theoretical primacy to the State that is 
undeserved and unnecessary.  The bundle of overlapping, only partially 
coordinated, and frequently conflicting associations we usually reify as 
“the State” is not fundamentally different from other organized human 
groups, and its primacy in modern society is more a result of a particular 
level of technology and the ability of those who control State associations 
to systematically break down their rivals.  Similarly, the associations we 
call “families” and those engaged in economic enterprises are not 
substantially different in their societal effects from the voluntary 
associations.  In Frederic Maitland’s words, there is a “genus” of which 
                                                          
1994) (1993) (demonstrating how modern American political trends undermine the 
importance of religious beliefs). 
 10. See ROBERT A. NISBET, COMMUNITY AND POWER 98-107 (1962) (placing voluntary 
associations in opposition to the alliance of the State and capital); see also PETER BERGER & 
RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE:  FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 158-59 
(Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996) (combining the State and market enterprises into 
“megastructures” to which voluntary associations stand in opposition); cf. JEAN L. COHEN & 
ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 130-33 (1992) (discussing the work 
of Talcott Parsons, whose concept of society viewed voluntary associations as a sphere of 
interaction between the State and the market); RICHARD A. COUTO & CATHERINE S. 
GUTHRIE, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK BETTER:  MEDIATING STRUCTURES, SOCIAL CAPITAL, 
AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT 38 (1999) (explaining how voluntary associations have 
protected liberty and community from government policies and market capitalism).  See 
generally David E. Price, Community, “Mediating Structures,” and Public Policy, 62 
SOUNDINGS 369, 391 (1979) (arguing that the State cannot be the “prime creator of 
community life,” and that policymakers must think responsibly about the ethical impacts of 
community organization); David L. Sills, Voluntary Associations:  Sociological Aspects, in 
16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 362, 363-64 (David L. Sills ed., 
1968) (excluding organizations that function in the market from consideration as voluntary 
associations); Leonard L. Silverstein, The Third Sector:  Commission on Private 
Philanthropy and Public Needs, in AMERICA’S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT:  A BOOK OF READINGS 
299, 307-13 (Brian O’Connell ed., 1983) (distinguishing the role of the “third sector” from 
that of the State and market-oriented firms by arguing that voluntary associations both 
support and conflict with the State and business entities); David Horton Smith, The Impact 
of the Volunteer Sector on Society, in AMERICA’S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT:  A BOOK OF READINGS 
331, 338-41 (emphasizing the impact the voluntary sector has on sovereignty and 
accountability of dominant institutions of government and business). 
SNYDER.OFFTOPRINTER 8/9/2005  1:17:35 PM 
2004] SHARING SOVEREIGNTY 369 
economic and non-economic organizations, such as Microsoft Corporation, 
the Roman Catholic Church, the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People, and the Social Security Administration, are merely 
“species.”11  Sociologist Robert MacIver calls such groups “great 
associations,” all of them part of the community but none of them 
coextensive with it.12 
The goal in this Article is to sketch and defend a view of organizations 
that is fundamentally different from the instrumental.  To do this, I will first 
need, in Part I of this Article, to reconsider widely held but wholly 
unsupported assumptions about the State and its relations with other 
organizations in society.  Much of this analysis will rest on the idea of legal 
“pluralism.”13  In Part II, I will look closely at the idea of “sovereignty” as 
it applies to the State.  I will argue that the idea that one particular group of 
organizations in society—the ones we consider “the State”—enjoy all of 
the sovereign powers in society is neither logically required nor supported 
by practical experience.  With sovereignty decoupled from the State, Part 
III will then outline an approach to the relationship between State and non-
State organizations that we might think of as “multilateral associational 
relations.”  I will conclude by arguing that this multilateral approach not 
only better recognizes the inherent dignity of these other organizations, but 
also has the practical advantage of being the best way to foster the 
instrumental benefits we prize. 
I. RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND OTHER ASSOCIATIONS 
IN DEFINING COMMUNITY 
The first piece of my present argument depends on the claim that the 
State is neither a special institution that constitutes the national community 
nor is it the embodiment of popular sovereignty in society.  In MacIver’s 
terms, the State is not the community but is an association within the 
community, and is not fundamentally different, except in purpose, from the 
                                                          
 11. See Frederic William Maitland, Translator’s Introduction to OTTO GIERKE, 
POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE, at vii, ix (Frederic William Maitland trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1900) (noting that State and Corporate species “seem to be 
permanently organized groups of men; they seem to be group-units; we seem to attribute 
acts and intents, rights and wrongs to these groups, to these units.  Let it be allowed that the 
State is a highly peculiar group-unit; still it may be asked whether we ourselves are not the 
slaves of a jurist’s theory and a little behind the age of Darwin if between the State and all 
other groups we fix an immeasurable gulf and ask ourselves no questions about the origin of 
species.”). 
 12. See R.M. MACIVER, THE MODERN STATE 165-82 (Oxford Univ. Press 1932) (1926) 
(describing how great associations such as the Church and the family have an inner-life that 
is autonomous of the State). 
 13. The “pluralist” view, that law is not created by the State, but rather arises out of 
many institutions within society, and that the State has no monopoly on legal meaning is 
discussed in Part IV.A, infra.   
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other great associations.14  MacIver’s notion may strike some as wrong.  
After all, States are different—they possess military force, interact with 
other States, and unlike other associations, States enjoy “sovereignty” 
within their territories.  Sovereignty implies not merely that the State is 
different from other associations but also that it is superior.  A historical 
analysis of the idea of the sovereign state helps illustrate this point. 
A. The Idea of the State 
The modern idea of the sovereign State as a fundamental building block 
of the world is, in fact, a very recent artifact.15  As Daniel Philpott has 
shown, the sovereign State resulted from the Protestant need to establish 
legitimate authority for secular princes to resist the Catholic Church’s own 
claims of overarching authority.16  This occurred at the same time as the 
rise of the idea of nationalism (roughly the 17th to the 19th centuries) and 
resulted in the modern nation-State.17  That State, with its claims to be the 
embodiment of the national community, is a concept so natural to most of 
us that we find it hard to believe that it would have been viewed as not 
merely strange, but entirely absurd just a few hundred years ago.18  The 
medieval world was not a world of States and Individuals but a web of 
overlapping sovereignties, each strictly circumscribed, with no one 
association capable of controlling the others.19 
Consider the first modern superpower.  The sixteenth century “Spanish 
Empire” of Charles V and Philip II does not remotely resemble a bipolar 
Individual/State world.20  The empire was an expanse of unrelated lands 
                                                          
 14. See id. at 480-86 (theorizing that the State is a common channel that operates to 
serve all facets of social life). 
 15. I have explored this point before in Franklin G. Snyder, Nomos, Narrative, and 
Adjudication:  Toward a Jurisgenetic Theory of Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1623, 1635-
43 (1999). 
 16. See DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY:  HOW IDEAS SHAPED 
MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 28 (2001) (arguing that the authority of the Catholic 
empire was one of several key elements that shaped the development of global society). 
 17. See E. J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 18-19 (2d ed. 1992) 
(describing how the concept of the “nation” in the nineteenth-century had grown into a 
collective sovereignty that constituted a body of citizens and their representative political 
expressions). 
 18. See JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 13, 30 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2d ed. 1914) (1896) (noting that the importance of the monarchy and the aristocracy in 
medieval times would have made it difficult for medieval scholars to conceptualize 
sovereign state power as it exists today). 
 19. See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 117-20 (1992) 
(describing how the rise of urbanization from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries led to the 
proliferation of scattered nation-states in western Europe); FIGGIS, supra note 18, at 38 
(attributing the international struggles of the seventeenth century to earlier controversies 
between papal and monarchal authority). 
 20. See generally HENRY KAMEN, EMPIRE:  HOW SPAIN BECAME A WORLD POWER, 
1492-1763 49-56 (2003) (describing King Charles V’s struggles to restructure the Spanish 
Government in order to better govern Spain’s increasingly expansive territories). 
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with different languages, cultures, religions, and customs.  These were 
linked together by a network of ancestral property titles, religious 
sanctions, personal loyalties, and private enterprise, in which merchant 
banks or the Church frequently paid private contractors to provide such 
rudimentary State services as military defense and foreign conquest.21  The 
churches, universities, merchant banks, companies of condottieri, great 
nobles, and native chiefs who made up the Empire were not “mediating 
institutions,” but rather they were, to a large extent, sovereign entities 
uncontrolled by the Crown.22  The very recency of our concept of the State 
suggests that we need to be careful in describing its primacy as natural. 
In the medieval ages, people viewed the world as under the authority of 
Christ, with the human authorities exercising power in His name through 
the “two swords”:  the “spiritual” and the “material” or “temporal.”23  As it 
happens, the doctrine of the single temporal authority was, in the medieval 
world, almost entirely theoretical.  For example, when Emperor Frederick I 
claimed the direct right to rule in God’s name without being subject to the 
Pope,24 his claim was more aspirational than real. His Holy Roman Empire 
was a welter of thousands of entities, some temporal and some spiritual, 
without common language, laws, or culture, except that which the Church 
provided, each with aspects of their sovereignty that he was powerless to 
affect.25 It was not until the turn of the sixteenth century—ironically the 
time that the unified “spiritual sword” of the Church began to crack—that 
European kings could begin to give life to the idea of a unified temporal 
sword.  At that point, changes in technology and finance began to give 
kings a major military advantage over their rivals.26  They found the old 
                                                          
 21. See id. at 50, 54 (providing a historical analysis of how during the first century or 
two following Columbus’ arrival in America, the Spanish state was essentially a loose 
alliance of small polities, local oligarchies, and private enterprises). 
 22. See id. at 53 (noting that people in the Spanish territories in the sixteenth century 
resisted the idea of a universal monarchy). 
 23. See Pope Boniface VIII, The Superiority of the Spiritual Authority, in THE 
PORTABLE MEDIEVAL READER 233, 233-36 (James Bruce Ross & Mary Martin McLaughlin 
eds., 1949) (discussing how the spiritual sword, wielded by the priest, and the temporal 
sword wielded by knights and kings, are ultimately controlled by the power of God). 
 24. See Frederick Barbarossa, The Independence of the Temporal Authority, in 
PORTABLE MEDIEVAL READER 259, 261 (James Bruce Ross & Mary Martin McLaughlin 
eds., 1949) (proclaiming that “whoever shall say that we received the imperial crown as a 
benefice from the lord pope, contradicts the divine institutions and the teaching of Peter, and 
shall be guilty of a lie”). 
 25. Powerless in the legal sense, at least.  Judicious use of subsidies, preferments, and 
brute force could sometimes accomplish change in specific circumstances. 
 26. In the twelfth or thirteenth centuries, a collection of barons could easily field an 
army as professional and well-equipped as the king—and they often did.  By the turn of the 
sixteenth-century, this became impossible.  This is due in part to the appearance of the 
cannon, which was first used by the Turks in the successful siege of Constantinople in 1453, 
and to the development of firearms, which over time made the armored horsemen and 
bowmen of the nobles much less valuable.  See Richard Holmes, “Villainous Saltpetre”, in 
THE WORLD ATLAS OF WARFARE:  MILITARY INNOVATIONS THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF 
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idea of a unified temporal sword a useful propaganda device in their 
campaigns to crush the nobles and control their own merchants. 
The “temporal sword” evolved into the “divine right of kings,” the claim 
that all sovereignty was in the person of the monarch.27  Shorn of its 
religious aspects, it became the concept of “indivisible sovereignty” and the 
idea that there must be one person or group with ultimate unified 
sovereignty within any State.28  The idea powerfully influenced English 
thought and much of the modern world29 through the work of Thomas 
Hobbes.30  Harold Laski characteristically described that world-view: 
[W]e cannot avoid the temptation that bids us make our State a unity.  It 
is to be all-absorptive.  All groups within itself are to be but the 
ministrants to its life; their reality is the outcome of its sovereignty, since 
without it they could have no existence.  Their goodness is gained only 
through the overshadowing power of its presence.  It alone, so to speak, 
eternally is; while they exist but to the extent to which its being implies 
them.  The All, America, includes, ‘implicates’ in James’ phrase, its 
constituent states.  They are one with it and of it—one and indivisible.  
Each has its assigned place and function in the great Whole which gives 
                                                          
HISTORY 70, 70-72 (Richard Holmes ed., 1988) (discussing the increasing importance of 
firearms in warfare during the Reformation).  Kings, who had larger financial resources than 
most of their nobles, could afford the new siege trains and musketeers that gave them a 
decisive advantage.  Thus, from 1066 to 1485, for example, virtually every English monarch 
had to weather serious uprisings among the nobles, and many of them—Stephen, Henry II, 
John, Henry III, Edward II, Richard II, Henry VI, Edward IV, and Richard III—were at one 
point or another killed in battle, captured, defeated militarily, forced to flee the country, or 
compelled to make concessions by military force.  But from ascension of Henry VII in 
1485, English monarchs had few difficulties putting down rebellious subjects until control 
of the central government power passed to Parliament in the mid-seventeenth century.  The 
same process was happening at the same time in other countries.  In France, the power of 
the nobles was largely curbed over the reign of Louis XI, who died in 1483, by which point 
nearly all of France was under effective royal control, while in Spain the joining of the 
crowns of Castile and Aragon in 1479 under Ferdinand and Isabella led to the unification of 
Spain under central royal authority within little more than a decade.  After this, the risk that 
a handful of disgruntled nobles could overthrow the king was small; the later wars that 
challenged royal authority were no longer baronial squabbles but great popular causes, like 
the English Civil War, the French Wars of Religion, and the Dutch War of Independence 
from Spain. 
 27. See FIGGIS, supra note 18, at 13-14 (analyzing the relationship between sovereignty 
and the supremacy of papal and monarchal authority during the middle ages). 
 28. See JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 80-83 (M. J. Tooley trans., 
The MacMillan Co. 1955) (1576) (introducing the phrase “indivisible sovereignty” and 
discussing the roles officers of state play in sovereign governmental bodies). 
 29. Edmund Sears Morgan presents an interesting, if rather cynical, take on this 
development of popular sovereignty.  EDMUND SEARS MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE:  
THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 13-15, 58-59 (1989) 
(arguing that the rise of popular sovereignty was effectively a fiction designed to cover 
continued elitist governance). 
 30. See D.B. Robertson, Hobbes’s Theory of Associations in the Seventeenth-Century 
Milieu, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS:  A STUDY OF GROUPS IN FREE SOCIETIES 109, 109 
(D.B. Robertson ed., 1966) (stating that Hobbes considered the proliferation of voluntary 
groups in the seventeenth century dangerous to the sustainment of the monarchal state). 
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them life.  This is essential; for otherwise we should have what Mr. 
Bradley calls ‘a plurality of reals’; which is to destroy the predicated 
unity.31 
But as Laski recognizes, his argument is still much more theological 
(one with roots in such thinkers as Dante, Aquinas, and Boniface VIII) than 
it is a description of the real world.32 
It is a common view that the State is the sole embodiment of a 
community.  It has been in the interest of State officials to insist on such an 
idea.  But we must question whether there is any real difference between, 
for example, the private British East India Company, which controlled 
most of a subcontinent,33 and the present government of Somalia, which 
controls virtually nothing.34  By insisting on such a distinction, we may be, 
to some degree, Maitland’s “slaves of a jurist’s theory”35 or even slaves of 
the theologians. 
 There is a very old strand of thought that has, over the last 200 years or 
so, stood in opposition to the idea that the State is the embodiment of the 
community and the unified expression of its sovereignty.  Some of that 
thought is present in the structure of the original United States Constitution, 
with its talk of powers “delegated to” the national government, or 
“reserved” to the States or, more obscurely “to the people.”36  It evinces a 
notion that the State and the civic polity are not identical.37 
This school of thought is usually called “pluralist,” and it implies the 
                                                          
 31. HAROLD J. LASKI, STUDIES IN THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 1 (1917). 
 32. See id. at 3-4 (conceding that the monistic interests of citizens are subject to “the 
reality of the State’s personality”). 
 33. See PERCIVAL GRIFFITH, THE BRITISH IMPACT ON INDIA 143-53 (1952); 1 SIR 
WILLIAM WILSON HUNTER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA (1899) (describing the origins of 
the Company’s control of the subcontinent); see generally JANICE E. THOMPSON, 
MERCENARIES, PIRATES, AND SOVEREIGNS:  STATE-BUILDING AND EXTRATERRITORIAL 
VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1994) (discussing the relationship between “private” 
and “public” uses of force in European colonial expansion).  
 34. Currently, the “government” of Somalia is actually in Kenya because it controls no 
part of the country, which is “a patchwork of fiefs divided among armed militias 
representing the various clans.”  Marc Lacey, Somalia Leader, in Kenya Exile, Asks U.N. to 
Help Disarm Militias, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2004, at A6; see generally ANNA SIMONS, 
NETWORKS OF DISSOLUTION:  SOMALIA UNDONE (1994) (tracing the disintegration of 
Somalia).  
 35. Maitland is referring to the process whereby individuals tend to conform their 
observations of reality to their preexisting notions.  If we start from the idea that there is 
some kind of unified, singular sovereignty, we will interpret institutions in that light.  If we 
start by observing reality, however, we would be hard-put to derive any such idea from the 
conflicting and contradictory mechanisms that we see in the real world.  Maitland, supra 
note 11, at ix.   
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 37. Such a view is not a contemporary phenomenon; it can be seen in James Madison’s 
view of the conflicting groups within the Republic.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 16-23 
(James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2d ed. 1981) (1787) 
[hereinafter THE FEDERALIST NO. 10] (describing the role of the republic to prevent factions 
of citizens from imposing their views on those outside of the faction). 
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idea that the sovereignty of any community is not unitary but is exercised 
jointly by any number of associations within the society.  It has never been 
a popular idea, but it has never quite died out, even in the face of the 
modern mega-State.  In Europe and America, it remained alive in the works 
of such writers as Maitland, Laski, Otto von Gierke,38 John Neville 
Figgis,39 Mark DeWolfe Howe,40 Robert MacIver,41 and Robert Cover,42 all 
of whom have, in the face of the monistic State, stubbornly held to a vision 
of associational pluralism.43  Howe, perhaps, said it most plainly: 
The heart of the pluralistic thesis is the conviction that government must 
recognize that it is not the sole possessor of sovereignty, and that private 
groups within the community are entitled to lead their own free lives and 
exercise within the area of their competence an authority so effective as 
to justify labeling it a sovereign authority.44 
The key word here is “entitled.”  The issue is not one of granting “limited 
sovereignty” from the State to certain kinds of associations,45 but rather it is 
one of recognizing that associations have a right to be left alone that is as 
fundamental as the similar rights enjoyed by the Individual. 
Our modern minds have substituted one picture of the world for another 
(the sovereign State for the unified temporal sword), but this picture still 
does not reflect the reality.46  Even in our modern society, the concept we 
call the State is not a unified entity at all.  Rather, it is an aggregation of 
                                                          
 38. See OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY:  1500 TO 1800 70-
79 (Ernest Barker trans., Beacon Press 1960) (1868) (discussing the federalist interpretation 
of the role of associations in society as being equal to and independent of the State). 
 39. See FIGGIS, supra note 18, at 256-66 (concluding that the medieval belief that the 
monarch was divinely appointed was necessary to transition government away from the 
influence of the Church and towards a more pluristic political structure, of which the Church 
and the government were important components). 
 40. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term-Foreword:  Political 
Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91-92 (1953) (claiming that despite 
distinguishing between the liberties afforded to associations and individuals, the mere fact 
that the Court recognized certain liberties due to organizations represented “a step towards 
pluralism”). 
 41. See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 165-82 (discussing the relationship between the 
state and “great associations” and concluding that each are equally autonomous). 
 42. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:  Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61-62, 67-68 (1983) (claiming that both government and 
other institutions impact the interpretation of the laws of the State). 
 43. I have previously outlined the connections among many of these writers, with a 
particular emphasis on Cover.  See Snyder, supra note 15. 
 44. Howe, infra note 40, at 91. 
 45. Cf. Vischer, supra note 2, at 1020 (arguing that although associations have a degree 
of autonomy that allows them to “facilitate shared meaning among its members,” such 
autonomy is not without bounds).  Associations operate within the limits set forth by the 
State, particularly in areas where the State has a pressing interest.  Id.  They function as 
bridges between the State and the individual, and as such are accountable to both.  Id.  This 
notion is consistent with the idea of limited sovereignty.  Id. 
 46. See generally C.S. LEWIS, THE DISCARDED IMAGE:  AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDIEVAL 
AND RENAISSANCE LITERATURE (1964) (providing a useful comparison of the world-pictures 
of the medieval and modern worlds). 
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things tangible (people, land, goods) and intangible (history, ideals, culture) 
organized for particular purposes.  It is an association of people and 
things—more accurately, a group of associations, “a loose coalition of 
more or less independent collectivities,”47 which frequently overlap and not 
infrequently conflict with each other.  We use the term “State” as a handy 
euphemism for this network of associations. 
And these State associations are not easily distinguishable in their 
attributes from other associations.  De Tocqueville famously observed that 
in 1830s America, voluntary associations played a much larger role than 
they did in Europe.48  Faced with a problem, the French tended to turn to 
the government, the British to their aristocracy, while Americans formed 
associations to deal with the problem.49  This may suggest something about 
a uniquely American role for these associations,50 but it also reveals that 
the State and voluntary associations can interchangeably perform (and have 
performed) many of the same functions, including the maintenance of 
                                                          
 47. Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectivities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1215 
(1994) (explaining that this view of the State stems from the enormous scope of government 
operations). 
 48. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 504-06 (Harvey C. 
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835) 
(exemplifying how Americans, unlike Europeans, turn to voluntary associations such as the 
Church to achieve their self-interests). 
 49. See id. at 250. 
 50. The heavy reliance on associations in America may be misleading.  After all, there 
was no aristocracy in the young United States and the legal structure set up for the 
government was designed to be feeble, so anything requiring concerted action required 
action by organized non-State groups.  Whether this marks some uniquely “American” 
attachment to non-State organizations, or simply reflects the particular structural constraints 
of America before the Civil War is unclear.  Earlier generations in America had little 
difficulty in consigning large responsibilities to government.  As Professor Christopher 
Wolfe has noted: 
In early America, the legitimacy of morals legislation was widely accepted. 
Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, points out that colonial penal laws, derived 
largely from Scripture, were very rigorous (at least on paper):  “The chief care of 
the legislators in this body of penal laws was the maintenance of orderly conduct 
and good morals in the community; thus they constantly invaded the domain of 
conscience, and there was scarcely a sin which was not subject to magisterial 
censure.”  He goes on to mention laws regarding rape and adultery, fornication, 
idleness and drunkenness, (injurious) lying, and requirement of attendance at 
religious services (and prohibition of nonconforming religious services).  He adds 
that “the zeal for regulation induces him [the legislator] to descend to the most 
frivolous particulars:  thus a law is to be found in the same code which prohibits the 
use of tobacco.” 
Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 69 
(2000) (internal citations omitted).  Thus, we may be attributing to those antebellum 
Americans a preference for voluntary action when what we actually see is a lack of 
resources for any other kind.  Cf. Hernando De Soto, What’s Wrong With Latin American 
Economies, REASON, Oct. 1989, at 39-40 (noting that a sociologist visiting Peru might 
erroneously conclude that Peruvians “prefer” to work in smaller family-dominated firms 
rather than larger corporate entities, but in fact the predominance of family firms reflects 
nothing more than the lack of an efficient and honest legal system that would enforce 
promises among strangers). 
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public order and defense.  Much of the change in voluntary associations 
over the last hundred years can be explained more by the fact that many of 
their functions—providing charity, education, or life insurance, offering 
public entertainments, building roads—have been taken over by more 
efficient providers, usually the State or a business enterprise.  The 
increasing move to contract out services previously seen as public to 
private organizations further blurs the distinction. 
The features that many commentators find in voluntary associations are 
also found in State associations.  Vischer, for example, lists four 
characteristics of the mediating institutions he studies:  identity, expression, 
purpose, and meaning.51  Yet State associations seem to embody each of 
these values at least as well as most of the groups that fit any of the 
standard definitions of voluntary associations. 
The State certainly provides identity because it invites “individuals to 
join together to pursue or maintain a common identity.”52  Especially in the 
wake of the destruction of the World Trade Center and the 2003 war in 
Iraq, it is difficult to argue that membership in the American State is 
unimportant to Americans’ sense of their individual identity.  With respect 
to expression, the State provides “a voice in the world” for its “members’ 
views and values”53 in thousands of ways, from encouraging reading and 
discouraging abortions, to preserving the wilderness.54  As to purpose, the 
State enables its members to “join together in pursuit of a common 
purpose,”55 whether that purpose is waging war, caring for the poor, or 
preventing subdivision lots less than one-half acre in size.  And as for 
meaning, which Vischer equates with autonomy, if it is true that 
“associations require as much autonomy as possible to pursue their 
members’ chosen priorities and values,”56 and that this allows them to 
develop their own meanings, it is hard to find a more autonomous entity 
than the State. 
Nor is the “mediating” function of non-State associations different from 
the role that the State itself plays.  Certainly the family, the church, the 
business, and the voluntary organization all mediate between the State and 
the Individual.  But these organizations all mediate with each other in every 
                                                          
 51. See Vischer, supra note 2, at 960 (noting that these values are actually 
subcategories of the tension between associations, the Individual, and the State). 
 52. Id. at 965. 
 53. Id. at 978. 
 54. The State’s speech can have at least as powerful an effect on public discourse as 
that of any other organization.  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Language of the Arms Race:  
Should the People Limit Government Speech?, 64 B.U. L. REV. 961, 993-96 (1984) (arguing 
to restrict the State’s power to communicate, particularly in areas where the State’s biases 
are not countered by alternative perspectives). 
 55. Vischer, supra note 2, at 986. 
 56. Id. at 1000. 
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conceivable combination—the family with the church, the church with the 
voluntary association, and the voluntary association with the business.  The 
State also mediates with all of them.  The voluntary association may step 
between the Individual and the State, but the State may step between the 
Individual and the voluntary association.57  The true picture is not a pole, 
with the State on one end and the other associations in the middle, but a 
dense web, where all the various associations, State and non-State, interact 
with and influence each other, and in which variant meanings and value 
systems flourish like plants in a tropical garden.58 
Some might object that the State is different from other types of 
associations in that it is not voluntary.  To live within the United States is 
to be subject to the American State, but that distinction is more a matter of 
degree than it is of kind.  Certainly the State is an association that is more 
difficult to exit than, for example, the Sierra Club or a bowling league, but 
so is a family, a church, or the market economy.  Most State associations 
are, in fact, voluntary, even for those who reside within the State.  I have no 
obligation to join the Coast Guard or work for the State of California.  If I 
do not like the Fort Worth City Council, I can move to Arlington.  If I do 
not choose to be a Texan, I can move to New Jersey.  If I decide I no longer 
want to be an American, I can go to France or, if I prefer someplace lacking 
any resemblance to a State, Somalia.  True, unless I move to Somalia, I will 
have to live somewhere within some kind of State, but that does not make 
my choice of states involuntary.  Biology forces all human beings to be part 
of a family, and circumstances force people and organizations to be part of 
an economy; membership is no more voluntary than is the membership of 
the State.59  The voluntary nature of membership, thus, is not a ground on 
which we can distinguish States from other kinds of entities.   
B. The Role of Business Enterprises 
In our modern world business enterprises perform much the same 
functions as the state and voluntary associations.  The exclusion of business 
enterprises from most discussions of voluntary associations is interesting, 
                                                          
 57. Compare Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (compelling a 
private non-State association to admit women members), with Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 
530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (permitting a private non-State association to exclude 
homosexuals). 
 58. See Snyder, supra note 15, at 1708 (arguing that law is a product of the 
relationships between different groups and the procedures groups use to interact with each 
other). 
 59. See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 483-84 n.1 (noting similarities between the 
membership of the State, familial relations, and a connection to an economic system).  
MacIver adds:  “If the [S]tate is unique in its own way, so are the other associations in their 
ways.  And if the [S]tate is absolutely necessary to our social life, so are they also.”  Id. at 
484. 
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given that the Walt Disney Co., for example, is as much a voluntary 
association as Amnesty International—both organizations are aggregations 
of people and property working together to accomplish particular purposes.  
If we consider Vischer’s factors again,60 businesses and their products, are 
important in shaping the identities of Individuals.  Working for Sullivan & 
Cromwell or General Electric or the New York Times, riding a Harley-
Davidson motorcycle, wearing Nike shoes, or drinking Starbucks coffee all 
influence and shape the identity of the Individual.61  Business enterprises 
are also relentlessly engaged in expression—some of it designed to sell 
products, some of it designed to influence the political process, and some 
of it designed to do nothing more than promote a worthy cause.  Business 
associations plainly permit their members to join together in a common 
purpose, and their purposes are furthered by granting them substantial 
autonomy. 
The exclusion of business enterprises from the discussion is probably 
best understood not as a reflection of any analytical difference but rather as 
the political and aesthetic preferences of those who have written on 
voluntary associations.  Many of these writers tend to work backwards.  
They see something that they find valuable, whether participatory 
democracy, religious belief, or small-town values.  They note that these 
values are reflected or developed by certain associations, such as the 
NAACP, the Baptist church, or the suburban homeowners’ association.  
Because they view these institutions instrumentally, as a means to achieve 
the desired value, they tend to develop theories that these groups (though 
not others) should be favored by (or at least protected from) the State.62 
Thus, Robert Nisbet and Richard Couto both see the alliance of capital 
and the State as a threat to workers and social justice,63 so they presumably 
have little interest in an associational theory that would extend protection to 
                                                          
 60. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing how identity, expression, 
purpose, and meaning are common to both State associations and voluntary associations). 
 61. See generally VIRGINIA POSTREL, THE SUBSTANCE OF STYLE:  HOW THE RISE OF 
AESTHETIC VALUE IS REMAKING COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS (2003) 
(describing the interactions between the personal preferences of Individuals and the 
businesses who seek to meet such preferences). 
 62. See NISBET, supra note 10, at 283-84 (concluding that for society to truly be free, 
the State must embrace associations outside of the State which give people a sense of 
identity and thus encourage “a pluralism of functions and loyalties in the lives of its 
people”); COUTO & GUTHRIE, supra note 10, at 65-66 (claiming that the fear of despotism 
held by the Founding Fathers led to the creation of a government with multiple checks and 
balances intended to enable Americans “to pursue life, liberty, and happiness without 
government, rather than through its actions”). 
 63. See NISBET, supra note 10, at 204-11 (illustrating the dangers accompanying the 
assimilation of government and business through a discussion of totalitarianism, with a 
particular focus on Nazi Germany); COUTO & GUTHRIE, supra note 10, at 56-58 (claiming 
that limited government regulation of the free market system is necessary to ensure an 
adequate amount of public goods and to prevent excessive negative externalities, such as 
pollution from a factory). 
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business enterprises.  From the other end of the political spectrum, Peter 
Berger and Richard John Neuhaus regard the facelessness and 
impersonality of modern life as the problem, so they tend to treat both the 
State and the large business enterprise as “megastructures.”64 For both 
progressives on the left and traditionalists on the right, the business 
enterprise is somehow different in kind from the voluntary association. 
Given the goals with which such writers start, this approach is perfectly 
reasonable.  Nevertheless, it impoverishes our discussion of voluntary 
associations.  Even if we value associations only instrumentally, we need to 
recognize that many of the same valuable functions in voluntary 
organizations also exist in business enterprises.  For example, which of the 
following provides more social value:  the community food bank that gives 
away a loaf of bread, or the businesses that raised the wheat, milled the 
flour, baked the loaves, and delivered them to the food bank? 
Society may draw a moral distinction between volunteers and those who 
are paid for their efforts, but that goes to their souls, not to the effects of 
their labors.  With respect to social reform, the profit-seeking businesses 
have not been notably less progressive than labor organizations.65  The 
profit-seeking Brooklyn Dodgers were racially integrated before the United 
States Army,66 and but for State passage of Jim Crow laws at the insistence 
of other groups, the trains that ran through the South would have been 
integrated generations before the Civil Rights Act.67 
                                                          
 64. See BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 10, at 158-59 (explaining that the term 
“megastructures” incorporates the State and large corporate institutions, and discussing the 
difficulties these megastructures face in efficiently mediating between the private and public 
divisions in the modern world). 
 65. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS:  AFRICAN AMERICANS, 
LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 54 
(2001) (noting the virulent racism in American railroad unions during the early twentieth 
century as illustrated by the exclusion of African Americans from the American Railway 
Union despite their significant presence in the workforce). 
 66. Jackie Robinson signed a contract to play baseball with the Brooklyn Dodgers in 
1945.  See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHNICITY AND SPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES 12-14 (George 
B. Kirsch et al. eds., 2000) (suggesting that Dodger management may have been more 
interested in gaining access to an untapped source of talent than in altruistically promoting 
racial equality). Robinson played baseball for the Brooklyn Dodgers for several years before 
President Truman proposed integrating the nation’s military.  See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 
FED. REG. 4313 (July 28, 1948) (calling for “equality of treatment and opportunity for all 
persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin”) 
(emphasis added). 
 67. See James Cobb, Segregation:  South’s Most Infamous Legacy Born in the North, 
ATLANTA J. CONST., May 23, 2004, at E1 (identifying the economic incentive of railroad 
companies to provide first-class accommodations to all passengers who could afford the 
higher price ticket, regardless of race, and discussing the legislative response to conflicts 
arising amongst the mixed race passengers); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten 
Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115, 132 (1994) (observing that prior to the 
passage of the first wave of Jim Crow laws, which mandated segregation of railroad 
passengers, there was a surprising amount of integration in the South). 
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If we assess the values that mediating institutions are said to provide, it 
seems plain that business enterprises also contribute mightily.  Are we 
concerned about providing training in leadership and civic responsibility?  
Few organizations are better at this than businesses, as is obvious from the 
number of business people who regularly play important roles in civic life 
at all levels.  Are we interested in groups who can ameliorate the 
facelessness and atomism of modern society?  The Silicon Valley 
experience, with its close-knit culture,68 is at the opposite extreme from the 
faceless bureaucratic juggernauts of 1950s fantasies like The Man in the 
Gray Flannel Suit69 or The Organization Man.70  The small entrepreneurial 
enterprises that characterize much of modern capitalism are far less 
faceless and  more empowering than such entities as the Red Cross or the 
United Way.  Are we looking for entities that help individuals shape their 
identities?  For good or ill, businesses have always been in the forefront of 
those efforts.71  Do we seek those who are willing to advance meanings that 
challenge those of the State?  We need look no farther than business 
enterprises, which regularly challenge state pronouncements and spend 
considerable amounts of money to get their meanings across to others.72  
Finally, to the extent we are looking for Garnett’s “wrench in the works,”73 
for the structural counterbalance to the State’s claims to hegemony, we can 
find few groups that better fit the mold than large capitalist enterprises, 
which are perhaps the only entities within the State with the skill and 
resources to offer significant resistance to State overreaching. 
Some may question this description of business enterprises since 
businesses have often allied themselves with the State.  The melding of Big 
                                                          
 68. See generally Paul Van Slambrouck, Anthropologists Peer Into a Valley of Silicon, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 20, 1998 (discussing the unique environment in the Silicon 
Valley where employees share knowledge and create vast networks with colleagues, friends 
and family, resulting in a situation where the lines between home and work are often 
blurred), available at http://csmonitor.com/cgi.com/durable 
Redirect.pl?/durable/1998/01/20/us/us.2.html. 
 69. SLOAN WILSON, THE MAN IN THE GRAY FLANNEL SUIT (Four Walls Eight Windows 
2002) (1955). 
 70. WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (Univ. of Pa. Press 2002) (1956). 
 71. See Andrea McArdle, The Postwar Consumer as Feminized Legal Subject, 27 
LEGAL STUD. F. 221, 232-36 (2003) (describing advertising efforts in the postwar era to 
shape women’s identities as mothers and consumers by perpetuating the stereotypical 
perception of the woman as a homemaker through the use of mass psychology); Stuart 
Elliott, The Media Business:  Advertising; Kellogg Hopes That Health-Conscious Women 
will Want to Have Breakfast with Cindy Crawford, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2000, at C5 
(identifying the portrayal of an unrealistic body image as a common criticism of advertising 
and the media in general). 
 72. See, e.g., STUART EWEN, PR!:  A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN 357-59, 362-64 (1996) 
(describing the efforts of businesses to combat New Deal-era big government initiatives 
through public relations campaigns intended to restore faith in the private sector). 
 73. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (defining the term “wrench in the 
works” as the way in which voluntary associations prevent those in power from imposing 
their views on the minority). 
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Capital and the State has been a popular theme,74 and history is filled with 
examples in which forces of the State lined up with businesses to crush 
resistance from other groups.75  However, history is also filled with 
examples in which the forces of the State lined up with churches or workers 
or other groups to do the same thing.76  That one kind of non-State 
organization may succeed in allying itself with the State to crush its 
enemies does not necessarily mean that such organizations do not 
contribute to society.  It merely illustrates that a powerful State, although 
necessary, can be a dangerous thing. 
C. The Problem of State Centered Analysis 
The point of the foregoing is to emphasize that the distinction drawn in 
most discussions between the State, the business enterprise, and the 
voluntary association is a convenient fiction.  Convenient fictions 
accommodate theories advanced by many who write on the subject of 
voluntary associations, but they remain fictions at their core and fall apart if 
too much weight is placed on them.  This is not to say that the associations 
themselves are fictional.  As Laski notes, when we consider any group of 
people with a common life and a common purpose, “we seem to evolve 
from it a thing, a personality, that is beyond the personalities of its 
constituent parts.”77  The State is certainly such an entity.  Writing in 1917, 
Laski notes that one who looks at the battlefields of Europe “will assuredly 
not deny that certain personalities, England, France, Germany are real to 
the soldiers who die for them.”78  He also applies this personification of the 
entity beyond the State, noting that Lloyds of London is, to ship owners, 
much more than “the mere sum of its individual underwriters.”79  Such a 
group entity, he says, quoting Maitland, “is no fiction, no symbol, no piece 
of the State’s machinery, but a living organism and a real person, with body 
                                                          
 74. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing the common concern that a 
close affiliation between industry and the State will be detrimental to the public good). 
 75. A typical example is the nineteenth century use of the National Guard as “industrial 
policemen” to crush labor unions.  See JERRY COOPER, THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD:  
THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN MILITIA, 1865-1920, 44-45, 58-63 (1997).  
 76. The most notorious Church-State alliance was the Spanish Inquisition.  See Simon 
Lemieux, The Spanish Inquisition, HISTORY REV., Dec. 12, 2002, at 44.  The State has lined 
up with “workers” against businesses and landowners in places like Cuba, and with 
voluntary groups against powerful mercantile interests, as in the abolition of the slave trade 
and the temperance movement that led to Prohibition in the United States.  See ANTONI 
KAPCIA, CUBA:  ISLAND OF DREAMS 99-146 (describing the process of remaking Cuban 
society); see generally DAVID TURLEY, THE CULTURE OF ENGLISH ANTISLAVERY, 1780-1860 
(1991); John J. Rumbarger, PROFITS, POWER, AND PROHIBITION:  ALCOHOL REFORM AND THE 
INDUSTRIALIZING OF AMERICA, 1800-1930 (1989).  
 77. LASKI, supra note 31, at 4. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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and members and will of its own.”80  In this sense the Ford Motor 
Company is no less (and no more) “real” than the United States of 
America.  The distinction between them is not something mystical and 
fundamental but merely relates to their membership and purposes. 
When we approach the issue in this way, it seems apparent that the true 
flourishing of non-State associations cannot occur in a regime in which 
they are, in Hobbes’s colorful phrase, merely “lesser commonwealths in the 
bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man.”81  
Descriptions of these associations as “mediating structures,”82 existing for 
the particular benefits they confer on the State or the Individual, are 
unlikely to provide a suitable theoretical basis, if only because the choice of 
which organizations should be fertilized and which pruned will depend on 
the political and social views of those who happen to control the machinery 
of the State.83  The State has, over the centuries, shown a remarkably 
flexible aptitude for siding with religious believers against non-believers,84 
with non-believers against believers,85 with big business against insular 
communities,86 with insular communities against big business87—all 
conflicts from which the State emerges more powerful.  Justifying non-
State associations solely on their role as mediators in State/Individual 
conflicts is unlikely to provide a durable foundation for a pluralistic 
society. 
                                                          
 80. Id. 
 81. Vischer, supra note 2, at 958 n.38 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 218 (M. 
Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1946) (1651)). 
 82. See COUTO & GUTHRIE, supra note 10, at 3 (identifying “mediating structures” as 
synonymous with the following terms frequently used by other authors:  “the nonprofit 
sector, intermediate associations, civic associations, or voluntary associations”). 
 83. The approaches of Garnett, who values associations as structural counterweights 
that generate competing meanings, and Mazzone, who values them insofar as they foster 
participatory democracy provide an interesting contrast.  Compare Henry Adams’s Soul, 
supra note 3, at 1853-54, with Mazzone, supra note 5, at 711. 
 84. The paradigm example is always the Spanish Inquisition, but even in the United 
States the State has at times deliberately favored religious groups.  Until the 1960s, for 
example, American public schools routinely engaged in Christian prayers and Bible-reading.  
See A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 145 (1985).  
 85. The attempted destruction of the Catholic Church in Republican Spain and Mexico 
and the avowedly atheist States that made up the old Communist bloc come to mind.  See 
MARY VINCENT, CATHOLICISM IN THE SECOND SPANISH REPUBLIC: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN 
SALAMANCA, 1930-1936 250 (1996); MARTIN MCCAULEY, THE SOVIET UNION SINCE 1917 
149 (1981). 
 86. The most vivid examples in American history are the use of State forces to crush 
labor unions and other opposition to the powerful mining interests, but examples are hardly 
difficult to find.  See generally SAMUEL YELLEN, AMERICAN LABOR STRUGGLES, 1877-1934 
(1969) (detailing such events as the Railroad Uprisings, the Ludlow Massacre, and the 
Haymarket Bombing). 
 87. For example, the Jim Crow laws that forced national railroad enterprises to 
segregate their trains were necessary because the profit-seeking businesses were unwilling 
to do so voluntarily due to the fact that such a policy would reduce their profits.  See supra 
note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the background to the segregation of railroad 
facilities). 
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We need an approach that allows non-State associations to flourish as 
ends in themselves, not as appendages of some larger body.  And that will 
require us to detach the concept of sovereignty from that of the State.   
II. DETACHING SOVEREIGNTY FROM THE STATE 
This may seem a formidable task.  After all, our modern idea of 
sovereignty is so intertwined with that of the State that lawyers, for 
example, hardly ever deal with it except in connection with the 
government.  A legal dictionary calls it “the supreme, absolute, and 
uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed.”88  Since 
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the system of international relations has 
tied the notion of sovereignty directly to States.89  But scholars are now 
coming to understand that this notion was hardly inevitable; it was the 
result of particular processes operating in particular systems at particular 
times.90  Interestingly, the idea of detaching sovereignty from the State 
sounds more plausible today than a generation ago.   
In the 1950s, for example, the world was becoming more concentrated.  
The common perception was that big institutions were inevitably going to 
get bigger and that bureaucracy was going to get ever more powerful.  It 
was, in short, the world of Orwell’s 1984.91  The globe was divided into 
two great blocs that seemed immutable.  Pluralistic democracies faced in 
world communism a powerful, apparently unified totalitarian force that 
claimed that history was on its side—a claim with which many agreed.  
American capitalism had settled into something that hardly looked less 
State-like, dominated by giant corporations, such as AT&T, General 
Motors, United States Steel, IBM, Sears Roebuck, Esso and Penn 
Central—companies so large that they would inevitably dominate their 
industries and stifle all individual innovation.  Under this global structure, 
our future choices would be determined either by the all-consuming State 
or the all-consuming corporation, which would not only decide what we 
would eat, wear, and drive, but would even mysteriously control our 
thoughts.92 
                                                          
 88. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979). 
 89. See HIDEAKI SHINODA, RE-EXAMINING SOVEREIGNTY:  FROM CLASSICAL THEORY TO 
THE GLOBAL AGE 14-15 (2000). 
 90. See HENDRIK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS 153-80 (1995); 
PHILPOTT, supra note 16, at 97-122. 
 91. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949); see Mark Schorer, 1940’s; When Newspeak Was 
New, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at Section 7-63 (describing the novel 1984 as an 
“enormously careful and complete account of life in the super-state” whose goal is “the total 
destruction of the individual identity”), available at http://query. 
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E2DE153FF935A35753C1A960958260.   
 92. See, e.g., VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 3 (1957) (describing 
“large-scale efforts being made, often with impressive success, to channel our unthinking 
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In such a world the idea that States might lose power seemed as 
ridiculous as the idea that a Japanese motorbike manufacturer might 
significantly contribute to the Chrysler corporation’s brush with 
bankruptcy, or that the dominant retailer of the future would be a Ben 
Franklin franchisee in Bentonville, Arkansas.93  The metaphor of the “Iron 
Curtain” implied more than an ideological divide; it suggested that the 
modern State really did have the power to control everything within its 
borders and exclude everything without. 
We now realize that very little of this was true.  The fall of communism 
revealed that the totalitarian Soviet State was never as unified or as 
powerful (except militarily) as it seemed.  We went through the 
conglomerate boom of the 1960s and dis-conglomeration boom of the 
1980s.  We watched the rise of Invincible Japan in the 1970s and its fall in 
the 1990s.   
We are thus in a better position than we were a half-century ago to 
realize that this picture has never been particularly accurate, nor has it been 
a fundamental building block of political or social theory.94  “Sovereignty” 
is a concept that has been constructed both internally and externally.  
Internally, as noted above,95 it developed because particular people, seeking 
particular powers, discovered theological and philosophical ideas they 
found useful in particular conflicts.96  Externally, it developed because 
those in power within States found it useful to find a framework in which 
                                                          
habits, our purchasing decisions, and our thought processes by the use of insights gleaned 
from psychiatry and the social sciences,” with the result that “many of us are being 
influenced and manipulated, far more than we realize, in the patterns of our everyday 
lives”). 
 93. The fact that both of these “ridiculous” ideas actually occurred shows that public 
perception may not always be correct and that society may change in unpredictable ways.  
See TETSUO SAKIYA, HONDA MOTOR:  THE MEN, THE MANAGEMENT, THE MACHINES 12-13, 
134-35 (Kiyoshi Ikemi trans., Timothy Porter ed., 1982) (describing the expansion of Honda 
during the 1960s from a company dealing solely in motorbikes to a major player in the 
automotive field and the impact that the introduction of compact cars by Honda and other 
Japanese automakers had on the American automobile industry); SAM WALTON, MADE IN 
AMERICA:  MY STORY 32-33 (1992) (describing the founder of Wal-Mart’s humble 
beginnings running a variety store in the small, “sad-looking country town” of Bentonville, 
Arkansas); Michael Massing, Detroit’s Strange Bedfellows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1988, 
Section 6, at 20 (identifying the increased competition from Japanese automakers, 
particularly with regard to the introduction of gas-saving, compact cars to the American 
market, as a factor in Chrysler’s financial troubles during the late 1970s and early 1980s). 
 94. See JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 237-48 (1995) (tracing the 
development of the doctrine of sovereignty and arguing that it is not a fundamental aspect of 
political theory, but rather the result of particular historical processes). 
 95. See supra Part I.A (discussing the development of sovereignty in medieval Europe). 
 96. The studies by Laski and Figgis are still the classic descriptions of this process.  See 
FIGGIS, supra note 18, at 5-6, 13 (comparing monist theories concerning the sovereign state 
to the perception during medieval times that the monarch was bestowed the right to rule by 
God and thus had unlimited power); LASKI, supra note 31, at 3-6 (introducing the concept of 
monism, which views the overarching State as necessary to give meaning to the lives of its 
citizens). 
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to mediate with other States for particular advantages.97  The practical uses 
of sovereignty in the international arena certainly have never matched the 
rhetoric.  In practice, sovereignty has taken on a much more fluid and more 
pragmatic role.98 
The sovereign State is also under attack today in ways that it has not 
been in recent years, both internally and externally.  Internally, many of 
those on the left who traditionally have allied with the State  against 
reactionary groups in society, have begun to realize that unitary sovereignty 
is a mixed blessing.  That concept, after all, has played a major role in the 
subjugation and destruction of various native societies within larger 
modern States; claims of Australian aborigines or Native Americans to 
some kind of sovereignty have largely been quashed.99  And others on the 
left, wary of the power of the State with regard to marginalized groups, 
have also begun calling for a concept of sovereignty detached from the 
State.100  More pragmatically, some commentators have observed the 
practical disaggregation of sovereignty accomplished by politicians faced 
with claims for autonomy by groups from Indonesia to Northern Ireland.101 
                                                          
 97. See Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber, The Social Construction of State 
Sovereignty, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 1-3 (Thomas J. Biersteker & 
Cynthia Weber eds., 1996) (arguing that sovereignty is a “fundamentally contested concept” 
that is “a product of the actions of powerful agents and the resistances to those actions by 
those located at the margins of power”).  Thus, the European States used the concept to 
protect themselves from each other at the same time that they were free to exploit and 
dominate other native peoples (who did not qualify as “States”) and even their own restive 
minorities.  Id. at 2. 
 98. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY:  ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 40-43 (1999) 
(arguing that states have never been as sovereign as theory claims and that the doctrine of 
State sovereignty is actually “organized hypocrisy”). 
 99. See VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN:  THE PAST AND 
FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 25-27 (Univ. of Tex. Press 1998) (1984) 
(examining the U.S. government’s reluctance throughout the nation’s history to extend 
sovereign rights to Native American tribes largely due to an inability to comprehend the 
non-Eurocentric governing philosophy of the tribes); HENRY REYNOLDS, ABORIGINAL 
SOVEREIGNTY:  REFLECTIONS ON RACE, STATE AND NATION 16-17, 41 (1996) (suggesting that 
early English cases examining claims of tribal sovereignty in Australia were unduly 
influenced by cultural biases and racist opinions, and therefore incorrectly determined that 
the native inhabitants of Australia “had no law and no sovereignty” prior to colonization by 
the British); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT:  THE MASKING OF JUSTICE viii (1997) (claiming that the U.S. government has 
historically limited the rights of Native Americans and that the law as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court “has actually contributed to the diminution of the sovereign status of tribes 
and has placed tribes and their citizens/members in a virtually destabilized state”). 
 100. See, e.g., Laura Brace & John Hoffman, Introduction:  Reclaiming Sovereignty, in 
RECLAIMING SOVEREIGNTY 1-6, 2-3 (Laura Brace & John Hoffman eds., 1997) (introducing 
a collection of essays which seek to de-link sovereignty from the idea of statehood); JOHN 
HOFFMAN, SOVEREIGNTY 18-20 (1998) (arguing that a coherent account of sovereignty must 
detach it from the State); cf. Cover, supra note 42, at 61-62, 67-68  (arguing that the State 
has no privilege over other groups in the development and articulation of legal meanings). 
 101. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC 
SOVEREIGNTY 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (recognizing that the concept of sovereignty 
is comprised of multiple components and finding solutions to common theoretical problems 
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Thus, while the idea that unitary sovereignty resides in the State is still 
powerful,102 the current contested status of the doctrine is perhaps 
illustrated best by the fact that there are no fewer than three recent books 
that all share the title Beyond Sovereignty.103  Increases in demands for 
local autonomy by various groups have often resulted in creation of quasi-
sovereign groups, and theory has thus been changing to accommodate the 
new realities.104  Further, over the last half century the legitimacy of 
violence as a normal instrument of statecraft, both domestically and 
internationally, has declined among developed countries.105  To the extent 
that the State’s primary role is to control and channel organized violence, it 
becomes relatively less important as the threat of international violence 
decreases. 
The sweeping technological and social changes that have made national 
borders more permeable are also impacting sovereignty.  The old idea of 
sovereignty reflected a certain level of technology, when intrusion into a 
State required physical intrusion, and in which the State could, with relative 
ease, control its borders and those who acted within them.  But modern 
technology and social structures have destabilized the old stasis.106  Modern 
mass communications, the rise of multinational corporations and other 
international non-governmental organizations, and the growing 
                                                          
through the disaggregation of these individual components from the overarching concept of 
sovereignty). 
 102. See MICHAEL ROSS FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE 
SOVEREIGN STATE:  THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 32 
(1995) (articulating the continued relevance of unitary sovereignty as a “guide to an entity’s 
international status,” a tool in the resolution of inter-State disputes, and a measure of the 
reach of a State’s power). 
 103. E.g., DAVID J. ELKINS, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY:  TERRITORY AND POLITICAL 
ECONOMY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995); BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY:  COLLECTIVELY 
DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS (Tom Farer ed., 1996); BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY:  
ISSUES FOR A GLOBAL AGENDA (Maryann Cusimano Love ed., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter 
GLOBAL AGENDA]. 
 104. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:  THE 
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 333-35 (rev. ed. 1996) (1990) (examining 
instances where a limited amount of autonomy has been given to groups within a sovereign 
State, usually in response “to geographic, political, ethnic, linguistic, or other differences 
within a single sovereignty”); Krasner, supra note 101, at 20-21 (illustrating the idea of 
quasi-sovereignty through the situation in Hong Kong, which, although a part of the 
sovereign state of China, has been allowed to maintain its own judicial system); see also 
KRASNER, supra note 98, at 71-72 (noting that institutions have become embedded into the 
foundation of the State and thus have a tremendous impact on State action). 
 105. See JOHN L. GADDIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, 
1941-1947, at 353-61 (rev. ed. 2000) (1972) (arguing that the decreasing legitimacy of 
violence in the international arena is one of the causes that led to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union). 
 106. See VIRGINIA POSTREL, THE FUTURE AND ITS ENEMIES 193-94 (1999) (recognizing 
that recent technical innovations and social developments have caused boundaries to blur, 
but not disappear entirely, and have created global society dynamically on the verge 
“between formerly segregated economies, nations, and cultures; between home and work, 
male and female, East and West, children and adults”). 
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globalization of trade have made the old territorial State less powerful and 
less able to control its own citizens.  The global communications revolution 
makes it more difficult for States to keep alien ideas outside their 
borders.107  Issues of crime and environmental degradation, once inherently 
local, are increasingly transnational problems that individual States cannot 
solve on their own.108  No one knows how this will effect our future 
concept of sovereignty, but there is no shortage of guesses.109 
The point of all this is merely to show that the concept of detaching 
sovereignty from the State is not as far-fetched as it once seemed.  The 
international arena, the place where States historically have been at their 
most State-like, is now a growing web of multinational institutions, both 
private and public, making it harder to draw sharp distinctions between 
private and public entities.  Domestically, claims for sovereignty by 
marginalized groups, distrustful of central authority, are also challenging 
the notion that the State and the community are one.110  This changing 
environment means that an approach to voluntary associations that rejects 
the idea of the monistic State is theoretically and practically possible. 
III. TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE THEORY OF ASSOCIATIONS 
If we abandon the theory of the monistic State, what would our theory of 
associations look like?  The answer is far from clear, but the general 
outlines of that approach are not.  It will need to be rooted in the pluralist 
vision that the State is not the sole originator and interpreter of law.  It will 
have to recognize that all associations in society, from the federal 
government down to the smallest and most marginalized group, are 
formally equal and are entitled to dignity and consideration—to sovereignty 
in their own affairs.  Formal equality does not mean actual equality; the 
State is likely to remain the most powerful association for the foreseeable 
future.  But formal equality is important.  The police officer and the 
criminal are not actually equal; the former has the lawful power to restrain 
the latter.  But they are formally equal, which means that the officer may 
only use that power within lawful limits, infringing the other’s autonomy 
only to the extent necessary to carry out her function.     
                                                          
 107. See MONROE E. PRICE, MEDIA AND SOVEREIGNTY:  THE GLOBAL INFORMATION 
REVOLUTION AND ITS CHALLENGE TO STATE POWER 3-29 (2002) (analyzing difficulties 
States face in a world of increasing global information transparency). 
 108. See generally GLOBAL AGENDA, supra note 103 (collecting essays on issues that 
transcend State borders and that require multilateral support, such as terrorism, the drug 
trade, and ecological dilemmas). 
 109. See, e.g., BEYOND NATIONALISM?:  SOVEREIGNTY AND CITIZENSHIP (Fred R. 
Dallmayr & José M. Rosales eds., 2001) (collecting essays addressing the impact of the 
increasingly interconnected global community on sovereignty). 
 110. See supra note 100 (discussing the separation of sovereignty from the state).  
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A. Pluralism 
The pluralist thesis is that the State is but one of a number of 
associations within society.111  These associations share sovereignty over 
aspects of communal life.  Each of these groups is organized for a purpose, 
and each is an end in itself, not merely a piece of the “State’s 
machinery.”112  Some groups are organized for religious worship, some are 
organized for common defense and the maintenance of public order (the 
State), some are organized for the production of goods and services (the 
business enterprises), some for charitable or social or recreational purposes 
(the voluntary associations)—but all are sovereign. 
This means that in an important sense all associations are equal, from the 
United States Supreme Court to the Ku Klux Klan, from Microsoft 
Corporation to Amnesty International, from the Catholic Church to a 
bowling league.  They are formally equal in the sense that they are ends in 
themselves, with power over their own spheres of action.  They are not, 
however, factually equal.  Some are powerful, some weak; some are 
popular, others unpopular; some are influential, others marginalized, or 
even persecuted.  But that formal equality, while sometimes derided as a 
“fiction,”113 is important.  It is, after all, the basis of the rule of law. 
When, for example, a group of people gather in a courtroom, the judge 
has power over the group.  That power will be enforced, if necessary, by 
bloodshed.114  But in exercising that power the judge is not superior to the 
litigants.  A judge is charged with making the decision that one party must 
go to jail, or pay damages to another.  But our notions of formal equality 
require her to respect the autonomy and dignity of all the other participants.  
A judge may not, for example, base her decision on her own advantage.  
The judge’s relationship to the litigants is not that of the corporation to its 
subsidiaries; they do not exist for the judge’s benefit nor are they, in 
general, under the judge’s command.  Obviously, some litigants will have 
more power than others—some because the judge shares their values rather 
than those of their opponents, others because they have the political or 
economic power to bend the judge to their wishes.  If the litigants are 
valued primarily for the benefits they confer on the judge, these influences 
                                                          
 111. See Howe, supra note 40, at 91 (noting that the center of the pluralist theory is that 
the State does not possess sovereignty exclusively). 
 112. See MAITLAND, supra note 11, at xxi (arguing that associations, here called 
corporations, are fictions of law controlled by the State, and that as “artificial persons” these 
associations have no natural rights and are instead “a wheel in the State’s machinery”). 
 113. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Exit:  Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, 
and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1317 (1992) (arguing that our 
legal system is based on the idea of formal equality and free association but that reliance on 
these ideas often means overlooking particular harms that result from factual inequalities). 
 114. That bloodshed is rarely needed to enforce judicial decisions does not mean that its 
availability as an ultimate resort is not ever-present in the proceedings. 
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are perfectly legitimate.  But if we view the litigants as equal, and as 
entitled to equal respect and equal treatment, these influences are 
illegitimate.  The way we analyze the process is obviously important. 
Some years ago the sociologist Robert MacIver distilled much of this 
thinking into his work on “the great associations.”115  By “great 
associations” MacIver meant the three large entities that have most shaped 
the world:  the State, the church, and the business enterprise.116  According 
to MacIver, the State is frequently confused with the community, but in 
reality it is just one form of social organization within the community.117  
The State itself is an association, a specific organization within the society, 
not different in kind from the other great associations.118 
Another sociologist, the German Karl Hertz, subsequently explored 
MacIver’s thesis.119  Hertz’s articulation of what he calls “the MacIver 
doctrine” has strong parallels in the work of Maitland and Laski.120  
Agreeing with McIver, Hertz states that the concept, “that state, church, 
corporation and so on are associations within the community, not identical 
with it, is a doctrine of limited sovereignty.”121  This does not mean merely 
that non-State associations exercise limited sovereignty within the State—
as if the State’s power is delegated to them—but that the State itself is 
limited in its sovereignty. 
Hertz somewhat overstates the originality of MacIver’s insight but he 
recognizes its theoretical importance: 
By also identifying economic and religious associations as “great 
associations,” [MacIver] gives them places of equal importance and 
provides a theoretical framework for the discussion of the norms 
governing the relations among these “great associations.” . . .  What he 
contends for is, first, a particular view of the nature of “the great 
associations;” what he demands, second, is that we see the rights and 
obligations of these “associations” in light of their constitutions and 
relationships.122 
MacIver’s emphasis on the “great associations” is too narrow.  The claim 
                                                          
 115. See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 165-82. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 183 (noting that the State is but one social agent 
and not the source of ultimate power within society); see also supra Part I.A (discussing the 
concept of the state and its role in defining a social community). 
 118. Id. at 165 (noting that other “great associations” are neither part of the State nor 
subject to it, but rather they “exist in their own right” as the State does). 
 119. See Karl Hertz, The Nature of Voluntary Associations, in VOLUNTARY 
ASSOCIATIONS:  A STUDY OF GROUPS IN FREE SOCIETIES 17, 17 (D.B. Robertson ed., 1966) 
(arguing that MacIver created the modern theory of organizations within the social order). 
 120. These writers, along with Gierke, often use the terms of “fellowship” or 
“corporation”—the latter in its older sense of any organized group of people with legal 
status—to describe these groups. 
 121. See Hertz, supra note 119, at 18. 
 122. Id. 
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that church, business, and state are the sovereign entities suggests that there 
are no others.  Thus, where these three “sovereignties” tend to agree (as, 
perhaps, in Franco’s Spain) or where the State has outlawed or co-opted 
religious and economic organizations (as in the Soviet Union), MacIver’s 
theory might suggest that there is little or no reason for other groups to 
complain.  But that ignores the fact that powerful human aspirations and 
values are embodied in a host of private, secular, non-business entities, 
from small, marginalized groups like the proto-feminist reading groups that 
Mazzone studies,123 to large influential groups such as the Sierra Club and 
the NAACP.  While MacIver’s focus on the largest and most important 
organizations is understandable, the broader visions of Gierke, Maitland, 
and Laski, which recognize the same rights even in smaller secular entities, 
are more consistent with the pluralist vision. 
The difficulty with the pluralist approach—and the reason it has never 
been popular—is that while it is normative, in the sense that it values 
pluralism and associational autonomy, it lacks a unifying political vision.  
It values human dignity, but it does not call for any particular result of the 
process, and that leaves it with few friends.  The theory that associations 
should be permitted to decide things for themselves necessarily entails the 
possibility that they may decide things that others in the community find 
reprehensible.  Thus, those who share the same ideological goals may find 
themselves at opposite ends of the argument when it comes to taking 
pluralism seriously. 
Some have argued, for example, that decoupling sovereignty from the 
State and allowing pluralism to flourish would empower marginalized 
groups, like racial and sexual minorities.124  But others have come to the 
opposite conclusion, arguing that pluralism will legitimize pervasive 
ideologies of racism and sexism.125  Robert Cover, an anti-racist and 
incorrigible pluralist, tried to develop a framework for resolving a 
particular legal dispute among groups that involved a clash over 
substantive world-views—specifically, the battle over the tax exemption of 
                                                          
 123. See Mazzone, supra note 5, at 642 (describing the growth of women’s reading clubs 
since the establishment of the Massachusetts Bay Colony).  These reading groups were 
originally organized by the Puritan establishment in order to promote the reading of 
religious texts.  Id.  Over the next three hundred years, however, these clubs increased in 
importance and size.  Id.  Women, politically marginalized, used these clubs to discuss 
important social and economic changes, particularly by the time of the Civil War.  Id. 
 124. See, e.g., supra note 100. 
 125. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 685, 752 (1992) (noting that Cover fails to take into account hierarchical structures 
within “law making” associations and groups); Peter Margulies, The Violence of Law and 
Violence Against Women, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 179, 179 (1996) (arguing that 
Cover’s vision of the State as “jurispathic” overlooks the important role the courts play in 
protecting vulnerable groups, such as women). 
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fundamentalist Bob Jones University126—but his distaste for the 
university’s position led him ultimately to duck the question.127 
B. Multilateral Associational Relations 
Accepting the pluralist vision, however, does not tell us how we ought to 
go about ordering the relationships among associations.  But merely 
phrasing the question this way has taken us a great distance from the 
questions “how should the State go about regulating associations[?]” or 
“which associations ought to be protected from State interference[?]”  If we 
recognize associations (including the State) as equals, and recognize that 
they each bear their own sovereignties in their own spheres, then we need a 
theory of how to mediate among them.  We need, in Hertz’s phrase, a 
theory of “multilateral associational relations.”128 
Within any society, groups will be in conflict—civil rights activists and 
racists, abortion providers and abortion opponents, management and labor, 
believers and non-believers, gays and straights.  In any society there are 
mechanisms to mediate the conflicts among these groups.  In the most 
primitive societies, these mechanisms involve a range of factors from 
customs to religious mediation to armed violence.  The same is true in 
modern societies, but in modern society we have put control of armed 
violence in the hands of State associations.129  Yet, the ultimate power to 
mediate any dispute among groups resides in the State and often its courts. 
This notion of the State as a final arbiter is problematic.  In 1787, 
Madison stated that no one ought to be trusted to be the judge in her own 
case.130  The temptations to bias or corruption are too powerful.  And if one 
man cannot be trusted, there is even less reason to trust a group.131  The 
State is regularly in conflict with other associations in society, and in those 
conflicts it is both the party and the judge. 
For example, when the State decides that a religious university must 
permit interracial dating to qualify for a tax exemption,132 or that a civic 
organization must admit women,133 or that the Air Force may forbid 
                                                          
 126. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 127. See Cover, supra note 42, at 66-67. 
 128. See Hertz, supra note 119, at 18. 
 129. See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 187 (noting that the state is perfectly situated to 
take on this role, and is able to do so more thoroughly or adequately than individuals or 
organizations). 
 130. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 37, at 44. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 595 (1983) (holding that 
schools that discriminate based on race cannot be deemed to be conferring a public benefit 
such as to qualify for charitable tax-exemption status). 
 133. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) (holding that the 
Jaycees, a civil association organized for the advancement of young men, could not exclude 
women pursuant to the Minnesota Human Rights Act). 
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officers to wear yarmulkes,134 the State’s thumb is always on the scales, 
either directly or indirectly.135  Those conflicting roles have the potential to 
warp its judgments and create the obvious problems of corruption. 
The trouble is that now the only limits to that pressure are those that 
arise when (i) one State association tries to do something that is properly 
under the authority of another State association,136 or (ii) where the State 
has infringed on the rights of the Individual.  So long as it acts within its 
own jurisdiction vis-à-vis other State associations, and does not trample on 
the rights of Individuals, the State is free to privilege its own views and 
interests over those of other associations. 
A theory of multilateral associational relationships would view the 
State’s infringement on individual rights as illegitimate; unavoidable, 
perhaps, given the present state of human perfection, but something to be 
carefully watched and deliberately combated.137  The norms articulated by 
the State, in the pluralist view, are not entitled to any privilege over those 
of other associations.138  True, State norms may have to be imposed on 
other groups to accomplish the legitimate purposes that are within the 
State’s charter.  The reasonable needs of public order and national defense 
are legitimate concerns of the State, and contrary views of other 
associations may have to yield.139  Similarly, its members may properly ask 
the State to accomplish other purposes, such as building infrastructure, 
alleviating poverty, or eradicating racism.140  But in asserting its own rules 
over those of other associations the State inevitably infringes on their 
autonomy.  It also lessens the ability of these associations to carry out their 
own missions.  Thus, there is always harm to the fabric of associational 
relations even when the State’s infringement is widely agreed to be just and 
fair. 
To prevent unnecessary harm to other associations, the State must act in 
accord with law.  But this is not merely the “law” as articulated by the 
                                                          
 134. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (holding that the Air Force’s 
regulation of military attire did not violate First Amendment rights to religious expression). 
 135. In Goldman it was the State’s interest in managing its own operations, while in Bob 
Jones University and Roberts the issue was its intent to carry out social policies the State 
had adopted as being in the public interest. 
 136. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the individual 
states, rather than the federal government, had the power to proscribe guns in school zones). 
 137. See Hertz, supra note 119, at 33 (arguing that a pluralistic concept fights any 
unilateral control of one sphere of life by any one association). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 187. 
 140. Even in the international arena, States may reasonably choose to use military force 
to carry out policy objectives that are not, strictly speaking, related to their ordinary self-
preservation.  The Clinton administration’s decision to invade Haiti to promote democracy 
and alleviate the suffering of the Haitian people is an example.  See generally DAVID M. 
MALONE, DECISION-MAKING IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL:  THE CASE OF HAITI, 1990-1997 
(1998). 
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State.  Traditional legal theory posits that the State and its various 
appendages are the manufacturers of law, either through the usual process 
of its legislatures and administrative organs or, in the case of disputes 
where such rules are not clear, its courts.141  The classic account is that of 
the English legal theorist H.L.A. Hart,142 but it is widely reflected in 
American jurisprudence in writers as diverse as Justice Cardozo,143 Judge 
Posner,144 and in the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations.145 
But just as the State is not coextensive with the community, law is not 
coextensive with the State’s articulation of it.  The State is the association 
that enforces the law, and it has some role in articulating the law, but it 
does not make the law.  Robert Cover explained that the law bubbles up 
from underneath, in the contested interpretations of right and wrong of the 
various groups meeting and interacting in society.146  Cover was a radical 
anti-Statist, but he was not anti-law, and his approach is the antithesis of 
the Critical Legal Studies approach that equates law with brute politics.147  
Law is, rather, a natural outgrowth of human interactions, and groups in 
society generate competing legal meanings like a rain forest sprouts 
foliage.148  The State enforces legal meanings, but it does not create them.  
When judges decide cases on behalf of the State, they simply pick from the 
competing meanings that others have already generated.  This is important, 
because it means that the legal meanings advanced by any association are 
entitled to as much respect and consideration as those of a State 
association, even when that association is the United States Supreme 
Court.149 
Other associations therefore have no obligation to view the Supreme 
Court as infallible merely because it is, in some sense, final.150  To the 
extent there ever were “final” words from the Supreme Court, that day is 
                                                          
 141. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-36, 272-76 (2d ed. 1994). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20-21, 167 
(1921). 
 144. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 197-203 (1990) (noting 
that there are an infinite number of legal questions to which judges do not have the 
answers). 
 145. There is a sophisticated variation of this basic civics concept which is much heard 
in law schools.  This variation states that the Constitution says what five Justices say it says. 
 146. Cover, supra note 42, at 4. 
 147. See Snyder, supra note 15, at 1654-55 & n.151 (explaining that Cover’s views do 
not fit into any of the established legal theory perspectives). 
 148. See Cover, supra note 42, at 7 (noting that our society is held together through the 
force of “interpretive commitments” that define what law should be). 
 149. Id. at 28 (arguing that the legal interpretations asserted by judges are not objectively 
superior and providing the example that the Mennonite understanding of the First 
Amendment has an equal or superior status to the understanding of the United States 
Supreme Court). 
 150. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are 
not final because we are infallible, we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
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passed.  Other associations know that a change in Court membership may 
swing the State around to their side of a disputed issue.  This instability is a 
fundamental problem.  The availability of State power to coerce other 
associations is an invitation to associations to ally with it or co-opt it for 
their own purposes.  Any given instance of this may be entirely benign—
the State’s (belated) role in addressing racial discrimination is an 
example—but the result is increasing intellectual warfare, with attempts by 
all groups involved in a particular question to use State force to disable 
their opponents. 
The State, then, must be bound by law.  And the State has no monopoly 
on the meaning of law.  It follows from this that the State’s power over 
other associations should be strongest in areas where the law is not 
fundamentally contested.  Where there is general agreement among the 
associations in the community on the legitimacy of a law—and the vast 
majority of our public and private law is of this sort—the State is unlikely 
to infringe on the sovereignty of a group by applying those laws to it.  But 
where the law is fundamentally contested, as where significant associations 
in society reject the legitimacy of the rule, the State must tread carefully.  
In such cases there may be a legitimate reason to impose a contested 
meaning by force, but such situations should be relatively rare.151 
To illustrate this point, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade152 that a 
woman has, to some extent, a constitutional right to choose an abortion.153  
The Roe decision, involves a fundamentally contested legal meaning.  The 
opponents of Roe do not merely argue that the law is undesirable in the 
same way that a group of manufacturers might argue that an import tariff is 
too low or a given smokestack regulation is too costly.  The opponents of 
Roe contend that it is not “law” at all.154  They do not agree with the State’s 
articulation of the rule, and they are unwilling to defer to it.  They agree 
that the governing law is the Constitution, but they vigorously dispute the 
Constitution’s meaning.155  In a pluralist world, their meaning is as good as 
anybody’s, including the Court’s. 
To the extent, then, that the State backs its own interpretation, it 
inevitably conflicts with the associations that take a contrary view.  But that 
does not mean that it is powerless.  The State does not infringe on the 
                                                          
 151. The great desegregation battles in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, were 
fundamentally a struggle among State associations.  The segregated schools and the Jim 
Crow laws were State creations.  Abolishing the practices that did not intrude on the 
sovereignty of non-State associations. 
 152. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 153. Id. at 153. 
 154. See Cover, supra note 42, at 8 (noting that opponents of Roe v. Wade believe the 
Supreme Court has sanctioned murder). 
 155. Id. at 19. 
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sovereignty of other associations if it removes its own criminal sanctions 
for abortion.156  It does not implicate associational sovereignty if it chooses 
to fund abortions through its own medical programs.  Or if it prosecutes 
those who destroy property or injure other persons or disrupt the operations 
of those who are engaged in the abortion process, at least if it is applying 
the same standards that it would apply to all other breaches of the peace.  
These are all legitimate exercises of the State’s own authority. 
But it is another thing entirely for the State to compel other associations 
to adopt its meaning.  It infringes the sovereignty of other associations if, 
for example, it compels religious hospitals to perform abortions or requires 
employers to offer abortion coverage through health plans.  This is not 
because Roe essentially implicates religious beliefs (though it obviously 
does) and religious beliefs have a special status under the First 
Amendment.157  The issue here is the same whether the objection to 
abortion is religious or secular.  Where the meaning is fundamentally 
contested, it is generally illegitimate for the State to impose its meaning on 
other associations and compel their acquiescence.158  The origins of the 
objection, whether religious or secular, are unimportant. 
Another example is the debate over race-based preferences in education.  
The Supreme Court has narrowly held that at least some affirmative action 
is appropriate for purposes of diversity in education.159  The Court has also 
held that some sorts of race-based preferences are not permissible.160  
These are fragile holdings, however, and could conceivably be undone by a 
single change in the Supreme Court’s membership.  The idea of race-based 
preferences is fundamentally contested in our society.  A great many 
private educational institutions believe that it is not only constitutional, but 
in a sense even required by our common notions of equality and 
opportunity.  The point is that if the Supreme Court subsequently decides 
that race-based preferences are unconstitutional at State institutions, it is 
acting within the scope of its sovereign authority.  But if it purports to 
                                                          
 156. Just as it does not infringe on the sovereignty of any group if it, for example, 
requires its school teachers to refrain from classroom prayers or prohibits its police from 
prosecuting flag burners. 
 157. See generally Cover, supra note 100, at 19 (discussing Constitutional interpretation 
and the idea that different groups rely on different sources as the foundation for their 
interpretation, particularly in the area of religion and the First Amendment). 
 158. Id. at 68 (arguing that legal meaning is a restraint on power and that legal norms 
should not be circumscribed). 
 159. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding that the interest in 
attaining diversity at the University of Michigan Law School was a compelling interest, and 
that its affirmative action policy was narrowly tailored to achieve this end).  As such, the 
policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 342. 
 160. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (holding that the point system 
used by the University of Michigan’s undergraduate program was not narrowly tailored).  
As such, this policy did violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Id.  at 342. 
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impose that understanding on, for example, Yale University, a private 
institution, and forbids Yale to take race into account in admissions 
decisions, it is impermissibly interfering with another association.161 
There may be some objection to the formulation, that “general agreement 
among the associations in the community” is the relevant standard.  A 
general agreement is not a perfect agreement; there will always be 
dissenters.  This formulation leaves open the possibility that the meanings 
of some small and marginalized groups will not get the same protection 
offered to larger and more politically powerful groups.  But for at least two 
reasons, “general agreement” is likely to be the most realistic option.  First, 
unanimity within any community is impossible; the world is full of too 
many competing meanings to ensure that no one is ever burdened by a legal 
meaning he or she contests.  The practicalities of ordinary life require that 
meanings too narrow or obscure will generally be ignored.  Second, and 
more important, a pluralist view of associations is not going to make the 
situation of these groups worse.  True, a small and powerless association 
may still be overborne by State power.  Under a pluralist vision, the 
practitioners of a small and marginalized group who seek to engage in 
activities ordinarily banned by the State may still lose, but they were 
already losing.162 
CONCLUSION 
If our goals are instrumental, we may be well-served by a theory of 
associations that make them “mediating” institutions, put here to influence, 
channel, or mask the power of the State.  If our goal is not the rampant 
flourishing of a rain forest of associations, but rather the careful care and 
pruning of valuable plants in a well-tended garden, we may prefer the 
monist vision of the State and elect to argue over which associations should 
be privileged and which not.  We must be careful, however.  This will 
certainly be a political battle, and that means that the associations with the 
most political strength at the moment will likely be favored. 
We are often tempted to channel the power of the State for good ends.  
The State, after all, has the power to desegregate the schools and eradicate 
discrimination in housing, or to protect a woman’s right to an abortion and 
                                                          
 161. As it now stands, it is possible that if Grutter is overruled a private institution may 
be required to eliminate its race-based preferences under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2004), because the Supreme Court has held that any 
discrimination that would be unconstitutional for a State action is punishable if done by an 
organization that receives federal funds.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003); 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001). 
 162. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that 
practitioners of Native American religion had no constitutional right to use peyote in a 
religious ceremony). 
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a same-sex couple’s rights to create a family.  The problem is that it can do 
exactly the opposite—and has.  It can segregate as well as integrate, 
persecute as well as protect.  The monist vision means that we trust the 
State over all other associations as the one true keeper of meaning. 
But it need not be so.  If we value the human dignity that allows people 
to work for common ends in organized groups, and if we value the things 
that non-State associations do in society, we are best served by a theory of 
associations that rejects the State’s claims of superior authority.  We are 
best served by the pluralist vision. 
 
